We use unique survey data from Bulgaria's currency board to examine the reasons for persistent incomplete credibility of a financial stabilization regime. Although it produced remarkably positive effects in terms of sustained low inflation since 1997, the currency board has not achieved full credibility. This is not uncommon in other less-developed countries with fixed exchange rate regimes. Our results reveal that incomplete credibility is explained primarily by concerns about external economic shocks and the persistent high unemployment in the country. Past experiences with high inflation do not rank among the top reasons to expect financial instability in the future. JEL Classification: E5; F3
Beliefs about Exchange-Rate Stability: Survey Evidence from the Currency Board in Bulgaria I. Introduction.
Fixed exchange rate regimes often fail to achieve full credibility even after years of financial stability. If a country has a national currency in circulation, it has the option to devalue at some point in the future. Aware of that possibility, investors demand a premium on assets in local currency, which raises the cost of capital and leads to lower investment and lower economic growth, which may in turn contribute to the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime. As Dornbusch (2001) points out, "it is sometimes argued that a stabilization failed because it was not credible." A number of factors may contribute to incomplete credibility.
Financial instability may be a chronic problem and it may take a long time to convince agents that the current effort will be sustained. Negative economic shocks may generate new concerns.
There could be doubts about the intentions of potential policymakers around election times.
Although these and other factors are often brought up to explain incomplete credibility, direct evidence is difficult to obtain. This paper presents such evidence using unique survey data from Bulgaria.
Bulgaria introduced a currency board in 1997 after a severe financial crisis. Along with other reforms, the currency board contributed to a remarkable economic recovery and to restoring some confidence in the local currency, which had plummeted during the crisis. Yet, confidence in the local currency remains incomplete. Data from the Bulgarian National Bank show that a non-negligible part of the population persistently believed that the currency board would collapse with a sharp devaluation in the near future. Only about a fifth of the respondents believed that the likelihood of devaluation was zero. These percentages were fairly stable over time with no apparent trend of growth in confidence in the currency board after 2000.
There are a number of results in the paper, which identify various reasons for these expectations. In general terms, the surveys show that incomplete credibility is explained primarily by concerns about external economic shocks and by the perception that austerity under the currency board contributes to high unemployment. Past experiences with high inflation in Bulgaria did not rank among the top reasons to expect financial instability in the future. As we argue later in the paper, the weak effect of past instability on expectations is explained by the ongoing market reforms during that period. Overall, expectations of devaluation are evidently driven primarily by forward-looking considerations regarding economic growth and the ability of the economy to withstand external influences.
The results presented here complement earlier literature, which has used interest rate spreads and forward exchange rate contracts to study credibility. Rose and Svensson (1995) , and Bekaert and Gray (1998) analyze the credibility of exchange rate target zones in the European
Monetary System. Related to the analysis here are studies on currency board credibility in Argentina, Hong Kong, and Bulgaria by Schmukler and Serven (1992) , Rzepkowski (2003) , Carlson and Valev (2001) , and Slavova (2003) .
There are several advantages to using survey data. First, survey data can reveal concerns that cannot be detected using available financial data. Schmukler and Serven (2002) explain expected devaluation in Argentina by various economic and political shocks. They also find, however, that confidence in the peso remained incomplete even in periods of "tranquility". The same is observed in Bulgaria. The survey data show that, as in Obstfeld (1997) , expectations are affected by the possibility for future shocks even if shocks do not occur.
Second, the surveys allow us to test the effect of beliefs about the monetary regime on expectations. In Bulgaria, about a third of the population was aware that the currency board eliminates monetary discretion, prevents the central bank from making loans to the government, and requires large exchange rate reserves. Interestingly, agents who were familiar with those restrictions had lower confidence in the long-term sustainability of the currency board. The surveys also show that a third of the population believed that the currency board contributed to high unemployment in the country. These views were associated with lower credibility.
A third advantage of survey data in that context is that they reveal short-term and longterm credibility. When credibility is low, financial assets have short-term maturity, so interest rates or forward contracts cannot be used to measure longer-term expectations. This is the case in Bulgaria. The surveys ask about expected devaluation over a 6 month, 1 year, and a 5 years horizon. The results show lower credibility over longer horizons. Finally, the demographic data of the surveys make it possible to study heterogeneity in expectations in the population.
Household survey data on expectations have been used extensively in the literature. Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) and Carroll (2003) are recent examples of analyses using the University of Michigan data on consumer inflation forecasts. Batchelor and Orr (1991) use UK consumer expectations data and Jonung and Laidler (1988) use Swedish survey data. Frankel and Flood (1987) and Kaminsky (1993) among others have used survey data on experts' expectations of the exchange rates of major currencies. The Bulgarian data used here are unique because the surveys target directly the question of credibility. The surveys ask respondents why they hold certain expectations after asking them to make a forecast. The next section provides a brief background on relevant economic developments in Bulgaria. We then present the survey data and empirical results in sections III through VI. Section VII concludes with final remarks.
II. Financial stabilization under the Bulgarian currency board.
According to Schwartz (1993) and Williamson (1995) , a currency board is a fixed exchange rate regime similar to a gold standard regime. The authorities forego discretionary control over the money supply and replace it with an automatic mechanism that links money supply changes to the balance of payments. The amount of foreign exchange reserves that the currency board stands ready to exchange for domestic money is sufficient to cover the monetary base. The currency board has no responsibilities to react to unemployment or to finance the budget. 2 In Bulgaria these operating rules are written into the Law of the Bulgarian National
Bank. The legal framework makes it difficult to change the rules of the monetary regime and also serves as an important "information device" (Ho, 2002) since the objectives and tools of monetary operations are spelled out in black and white. Although the law can be changed, it deters ad hoc changes in policy. The legal framework is an important difference between currency boards and standard fixed exchange rate regimes.
The design of the Bulgarian currency board is not completely orthodox as described above. The central bank, which was preserved as an institution, can provide liquidity to the banking system and its balance sheet contains a large deposit by the government. Each of these features can lead to changes in money supply irrespective of changes in the level of foreign exchange reserves. Hanke (2002) , Hanke and Sekerke (2003), and Nenovsky and Hristov (2002) show that, although they have generally not been deliberate efforts to conduct monetary policy, such changes have occurred over the last six years. This is not uncommon of currency boards or historical gold standard regimes as Desquilbet and Nenovsky (2004) point out. Nevertheless, one wonders whether confidence in the currency board is reduced because of its deviations from orthodoxy. We discuss this further later in the paper.
The currency board was introduced on July 1 st 1997 after a financial crisis in late 1996
and early 1997. During the crisis, the exchange rate depreciated more than 25 times, many banks failed, and prices increased at a hyperinflation rate. The collapse of the currency and the banking system wiped out the savings of a large part of the population. The currency board faced the task of restoring confidence in the local currency from near zero levels as almost the entire economy was dollarized. At the core of the crisis was a slow process in market reform. For several years since the beginning of transition in 1990, loss-making state firms operated on soft budget constraints and managed to accumulate large debts to banks which were in turn implicitly guaranteed by the state. Restructuring and privatization were advancing at a very slow pace as Dobrinsky (2000) describes. By 1996, it started to become clear that the government lacked the resources to back the credit guarantees, and bank deposits began to leave the financial system.
The process accelerated and by the end of 1996, the currency was depreciating rapidly, the central bank was extending large credits to keep banks afloat, and price increases escalated into hyperinflation in the first months of 1997.
which, as they argue, have historically originated endogenously to facilitate exchange.
The introduction of the currency board was part of an overall effort to restructure the economy. The government which came to power in 1997 cut subsidies, closed down large numbers of loss-making state firms, and accelerated privatization. In 1998 alone, it privatized as many state firms as were privatized since the beginning of transition. The government also tightened welfare and unemployment benefits and sold off many banks. As a result, the private sector share of Bulgaria's GDP increased from 45 percent in 1996 to around 75 percent in 2002, which put Bulgaria in line with the private sector shares in advanced transition economies (EBRD, 2003) . The currency board provided an incentive for those efforts because it prevented the use of money creation for debt financing. The government had to introduce harder budget constraints to ensure fiscal sustainability. The low inflation delivered by the currency board was also important in facilitating credit expansion in the economy and in encouraging investment.
Inflation and other statistics about the performance of the Bulgarian economy are presented in Table 1 .
With the introduction of the currency board, inflation declined and has remained low and output growth has increased. The hyperinflation in 1997 also helped reduce the domestic debt of the government. Interest payments on domestic debt declined from 17 percent of GDP in 1996 to 1.2 percent of GDP in 1998. Privatization generated revenues and contributed to growing foreign exchange reserves as much of it was done by selling firms to foreign companies. On those counts, the short-term outlook for the currency board looked very positive. In fact, the currency board and other reforms produced a remarkable turnaround in the economy from the early years of ad hoc transition. Internationally, the country was praised for rapid reforms and The financial crisis that led to the introduction of the currency board was the third high inflation episode since transition began. The price liberalization in 1991 and the correction of an overvalued exchange rate in 1994 produced sharp increases in prices and the exchange rate. The prior episodes of high inflation are important because the surveys ask whether past inflation conditioned expectations of future instability. Research has used the idea that chronic instability creates expectations of "temporary stabilization" (Calvo, 1986) . In the context of a transition economy, these experiences may weigh less on expectations to the extent that the root causes of earlier instability, i.e., slow reform, were a thing of the past. In addition, the experience has not been one of repeated failures of stabilization programs over several decades as in Latin America.
Prices were stable under communism before 1990. Looking forward, Bulgaria is expected to join the European Union in 2007 and the European Monetary Union a few years thereafter, replacing the local currency with the euro. Thus, a neat exit from the currency board is foreseeable on the horizon. The next sections investigate the extent to which Bulgarians expect a less orderly exit from the currency board regime.
III. Presenting the survey data.
We use data from four national household surveys, which were conducted by a national Respondents could choose an answer ranging from "very big" to "none", i.e., zero probability of devaluation, or choose to say that they could not provide an answer. Next, the surveys inquire about respondents' views on the effect of the currency board on economic activity and about their beliefs regarding currency board operations. In Question 2, the surveys ask whether respondents strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the statement that the currency board contributes to high unemployment. We are interested in whether respondents who perceive a negative effect of the currency board on unemployment have less confidence in its sustainability. In Question 3, the surveys ask whether respondents strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed or strongly disagreed with each of the following three statements:
Statement 1: Under the currency board, the authorities cannot issue currency at their discretion.
Statement 2:
Under the currency board, the executive branch of the government cannot borrow funds from the central bank. The three statements are correct and describe the main features of the currency board: the elimination of monetary discretion, the separation of the government from the printing press, and the backing of local money using foreign exchange reserves, although, as we pointed out earlier, Statement 1 may not describe the currency board well in practice. There are two opposing effects, which determine the effect of such knowledge on credibility. On one hand, understanding the features of the monetary regime should raise credibility because the currency board limits the monetizing of budget deficits and ensures large reserves. On the other hand, as
Irwin (2004) argues, a currency board may be abandoned in the presence of high and persistent unemployment. A policy that does not allow the government to react to negative economic shocks may be less sustainable than one which allows discretion. Our empirical tests later in the paper reveal which of the two beliefs has been stronger in Bulgaria. All surveys also ask about respondents' gender, education level, age, income, and which political party they vote for.
The 2003 survey included several additional questions on the currency board, which address even more directly the reasons for expected end of the currency board regime. First, the survey asked respondents the following question:
Question 4: In your opinion, will Bulgaria have a currency board in the next 5 years?
This question is broader than Question 1 on the possible collapse of the currency board;
respondents might expect an end to the currency board without a crisis. The most likely cause of such a change would be entry into the European Monetary Union. The survey then inquired about the reasons for an end to the currency board regime if a respondent believed that the currency board will not be in place in 5 years: Respondents were given the opportunity to provide up to three answers. For example, a respondent could choose A4 in the first round, A2 in the second round, and A1 in the third round. The first round of answers represents the most important reasons provided by each respondent. 4 Answers A1 through A7 provide an opportunity to test several hypotheses. A1
captures the importance of negative external economic shocks. Bulgaria is a small open economy, which is strongly affected by external events. A2 is perhaps strange at first glance as the IMF and the European Union have consistently supported the currency board. The answer was included because policies in Bulgaria often change under the directive of international institutions; the idea is that if a major policy shift occurs, such as removing the currency board, it will likely be the result of influence from international institutions.
A3 captures uncertainty about the "type" of policymaker which is a frequent feature in models of monetary credibility, e.g., Backus and Driffill (1985) . Expectations of devaluation may be higher for a respondent who does not believe that the policymaker is committed to the currency board. None of the major political parties in Bulgaria has advocated removing the currency board. Yet, political partisanship may fuel distrust of the current government, which was different from the one that introduced the currency board in 1997. A4 reflects the view that the currency board constrains economic growth by requiring fiscal and monetary austerity. The need to raise incomes may call for looser policies. A5 examines the role of past inflation in forming expectations. A6 captures the idea that the currency board is made necessary by weaknesses in the economy. As reforms advance and the economy develops, the need for the currency board will dissipate. Finally, A7 refers to replacing the currency board with entry into the EMU and adopting the euro as official currency.
In the next section, we present summary statistics on expected devaluation (Questions 1), views on the currency board and unemployment (Question 2), and beliefs about its operations 
IV.
Expected devaluation and views on the currency board: summary statistics.
Expected devaluation.
A currency board is fully credible when there is little or no doubt that it will continue to exist. Table 2 The results from the surveys suggest that the perceived likelihood of devaluation has been stable for the last three years. This is consistent with the stable proportion of foreign to local money in savings portfolios. In light of the success of the currency board in holding down inflation, we may infer that long-term issues have persistent influences on credibility.
The currency board and high unemployment Table 3 shows respondents' answers regarding the effect of the currency board on unemployment (Question 2). In 2000, 47.6 percent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that the currency board contributed to high unemployment. By 2003, that percent was cut in about half to 22.5 percent. Over time, fewer agents associated the currency board with high unemployment. The decline in the number of respondents who attributed high unemployment to the currency board was associated with an increase of the "I don't know" answers rather than with an increase in the "disagree" and "strongly disagree" answers. Bulgarians are apparently becoming increasingly uncertain about the reasons for high unemployment in the country or at least about the role of the currency board in the process. Furthermore, the declining unemployment rate since 2001 may contribute to a decline in opposition to the currency board on these grounds.
Beliefs about the operations of the currency board agreed or strongly agreed that the amount of foreign exchange reserves is sufficient to cover all local currency in circulation. Overall, judging from the answers to the three statements, the evidence suggests that about 35 to 55 percent of the population has knowledge of the operations of the currency board. 5 It also appears that the deviations from the orthodox rules discussed in section 2 have not influenced the perceptions regarding the Bulgarian currency board. Few respondents believe that the government has discretion over the money supply. The media has very seldom discussed the deviations of the currency board from the theoretical rules because the deviations have not produced detectable negative effects on the economy so far.
Observe that the percent of "I don't know" answers has tended to increase over time. A few papers have endogenized the distribution of agents into naïve or sophisticated and have drawn conclusions about the steady state proportion of naïve agents. In Crettez and Michel (1992) , all agents ultimately choose not to form rational expectations. In Sethi and Franke (1995) , the steady state is characterized by the presence of both sophisticated and naïve agents.
The data from Bulgaria show a mix of agents as in Sethi and Franke (1995) as well as a tendency for declining proportion of informed agents as in Crettez and Michel (1992) . The gradual loss of interest in the operations of the currency board may be explained by the continued financial stability in Bulgaria.
V. Explaining cross-sectional differences in expectations.
This section reports the estimation results of a probit model where expected devaluation is explained by respondents' views on the currency board and demographic characteristics. The dependent variable Expected Devaluation based on Question 1 ranges from 1 to 5 where 1 stands for high probability of devaluation and 5 stands for a zero probability of devaluation. We ignore the don't know responses. The models are estimated using six months and five years expectations from the four surveys and include the explanatory variables in the following The hypothesis is that political affiliation with UDF was associated with greater currency-board credibility. Age is measured in number of years and Female equals 1 for a female respondent, 0 for a male respondent.
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The results in Table 5 show that agents who believed that the currency board contributes to high unemployment consistently had lower confidence in its sustainability. This result holds UDF had lost political support because of its inability to fight corruption and crime, and the high unemployment produced by market reforms. Once it became clear that none of the major political parties in Bulgaria advocated removing the currency board, the effect of politics died out and Vote was not statistically significant in later years. Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest that it is primarily high unemployment that generates a persistent concern about the viability of the currency board. Over time, with the decline in unemployment, these concerns may gradually dissipate, as the non-significant effect of Unemployment on expectations in the 2003 survey suggest. Next, we use Questions 4 and 5 from the 2003 survey to revisit some of the effects reported in this section and to identify additional factors for incomplete credibility.
VI.
Reasons for expected end to the currency board in the 2003 survey.
We begin this section by reporting the distribution of answers to Question 5 on the various reasons for removing the currency board over the next 5 years. We then use multinomial logit model to investigate how these beliefs are related to personal characteristics of the respondents. The three columns in Table 6 represent first, second, and third round of choices.
The number of respondents who answered that the currency board would not be in place in 5 years was 446. Almost all of these respondents (433) provided at least one justification for their forecast. The second and third rounds of answers had fewer respondents as some gave only one reason. The number one reason for removing the currency board was entry into the European
Union. This was the answer of 27.0 percent of respondents in the first round. Of the less benign reasons for a perceived end to the currency board, three stand out: 1) the possibility of external economic shocks; 2) the need to raise incomes; and 3) pressure from international institutions.
The second concern, i.e., the need to raise incomes in the country, supports our earlier results in section 5, which showed that agents who believed that the currency board contributed to high unemployment had lower confidence in its sustainability. Notice that chronic financial instability was the lowest ranked reason for expecting financial instability in the future in the first round of choices. However, it ranked higher in the second and third round of answers, suggesting what while not of utmost importance, prior instability is still a concern.
Overall the results suggest that the backward-looking component in expectations is less important compared to forward-looking concerns about the economy. This may be specific to the context of a transition economy where the reasons for prior instability rooted in delayed reforms are gradually resolved. Similarly to the results reported in Table 5 , concerns about the economy, and particularly its ability to withstand external shocks, seem to be a primary reason for concern about the currency board.
Next we investigate the effect of personal characteristics on the choice of various answers to Question 5 by estimating a multinomial logit model where the dependent variable takes seven values for the seven possible answers on the first round. The marginal effects from this estimation are reported in Table 7 . The interpretation of results is as follows. The 0.09 coefficient on high school education in the first column means that, controlling for other characteristics, the probability that a respondent with high school education chooses answer A1
(external shocks) is 9 percentage points higher compared to a respondent without high school education. The coefficients in each row of the table sum to zero to reflect the fact that a respondent could choose only one of the alternative answers. The results in Table 7 
VII. Final remarks.
We use survey data from Bulgaria to examine whether expectations of devaluation persisted after that country achieved low inflation under a currency board system and to examine the various influences on these expectations. The data show that expected devaluation persists for a non-negligible part of the population. This fits observations from financial data that show a relatively small but persistent spread between interest rates on domestic currency and euro bank deposits. Although the currency board had a very positive effect on the economy and on regaining confidence in the local currency after the financial crisis in 1996-97, full credibility remains elusive. This is not uncommon in other countries, which have used fixed exchange rates to reduce inflation.
Theoretically, there are two main reasons for such persistent concerns. One is a history of high inflation in the past, which contributes to expectations of financial instability in the future.
The other reason is the awareness that economic shocks may destabilize the economy and result in a financial crisis. Bulgarians have reasons to voice both concerns. Bulgaria is a small open economy that is influenced strongly by international developments and, also, it has experienced high inflation since the start of transition. The surveys make it possible to weigh the relative importance of those concerns. The results suggest that forward-looking concerns about the economy are more important than the history of high inflation. This has two important implications. First, it explains why full confidence in a local currency is difficult to achieve.
Complete confidence or close to compete confidence would require that the economy sustains rapid growth rates and that it can withstand external shocks, which is unreasonable to expect in an open, less-developed, economy. The second and perhaps more optimistic implication is that structural reforms can help increase confidence in a macroeconomic stabilization regime.
Expected devaluation under the currency board in Bulgaria is not tied strongly to past inflation because the economy undergoes structural change as a result of market reforms. These reforms gradually eliminate the fundamental reasons for prior instability and therefore reduce concerns over renewed instability. In short, expectations respond to structural changes in the economic environment.
The persistence of incomplete credibility does not mean that the currency board is in any danger at this point or that policy changes must be implemented. The surveys reveal that expectations are stable over time, which lowers the risk of large swings in money demand. The persistence in concerns will mean that domestic currency credit will continue to carry a higher price compared to euro credit. If, as some authors have forecasted, the Bulgarian economy increasingly uses the euro as medium of exchange with increased integration with EMU countries, this economic cost will become less of a problem. There is also an orderly exit from the currency board on the near horizon with the approaching entry into the EMU. Unilateral adoption of the euro ahead of such entry would eliminate the risk premium on local currency assets but that policy raises a host of new economic and political issues, the potential cost of which is difficult to measure. Table 5 Perceived risk of devaluation, views on the currency board and respondent demographics. Dependent variable ranges from 1 (high probability of devaluation) to 5 (zero probability of devaluation) over the next 6 months or 5 years. Notes: The question about why the currency board will not be in pace in five years was asked after the following question: " In your opinion, will Bulgaria have a currency board in five years" to which respondents could answer "it will" (382 respondents), "it will not" (446 respondents) or "I don't know" (152 respondents) .
Survey respondents were asked to provide three answers choosing from the list of reasons above. The percentages in the first column show the distribution of first round of answers, the second column the distribution of the second round of answers., and the third column the distribution of the third round of answers. 
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Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***(**,*) significant at the 1(5, 10) percent level.
